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International Investment Arbitration in Geopolitical Competition: Analysis of Politicization Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Yaxin Xiao

(Master's degree, Luskin School of Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095, United States of America)

Abstract: This study examines the transformation of international investment arbitration from a neutral dispute resolution mechanism into a strategic battleground shaped by geopolitical competition. Through comprehensive analysis of paradigmatic cases—the Yukos arbitrations involving systematic tax reassessments, Huawei disputes concerning technology restrictions and sanctions compliance, and Belt and Road Initiative projects facing corruption allegations—the research reveals distinct modalities of criminal law weaponization in investment disputes. The temporal correlation between criminal charges and arbitration proceedings demonstrates strategic rather than genuine law enforcement motivations, with corruption allegations particularly prominent in politically sensitive infrastructure investments. The findings indicate that selective prosecution and political protection mechanisms enable sophisticated manipulation of legal processes to achieve geopolitical objectives. These patterns confirm fundamental structural limitations in the depoliticization promise underlying the investor-state dispute settlement regime. The convergence of criminal allegations with investment disputes transforms legal frameworks into instruments of economic statecraft, generating profound implications for international economic governance as investment protection increasingly yields to national security imperatives and geopolitical alignments in an era of intensifying multipolar competition.

Keywords: International Investment Arbitration; Investor-State Disputes; Settlement Mechanism; Geopolitical Competition; Criminal Law Weaponization

1 Introduction

International investment arbitration regime is bound to undergo an inevitable evolution characterised as increasing politicization. Home State intervention cases--and resultant inevitable re-politicization of the controversy--are back [1]. States bent upon avoiding payment for investment awards subject themselves to the re-politicization of investment disputes, an undesirable reversal to an era in which power politics decided the course of the legal controversy [2]. Effective efficacy of forestalling investment-state arbitral awards' non-compliance has been numbered as one of the benefits of the international investment regime. Standard investment awards' compliance studies by the states are rare, and quantitative studies establishing the extent to which the latter actually complied with adverse investor-state awards of compensation are scarce [3].

The crossroads of investment arbitration and geopolitical rivalry has produced hitherto unforeseen questions of legitimacy for the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Intersections of Geopolitics and Investment Agreements takes stock of how Geopolitics and Geopolitics and the Fragmentation of World Trade, respectively, explain how the tensions of geopolitics are breaking the multilateral economic system [4]. Ensuring state adherence to investor-state arbitral awards has been cited as one of the virtues of the international investment regime. Relatively little systematic scholarly work on state adherence takes stock of how far the states themselves agreed with unfavorable investor-state awards of compensation [3]. The sub-field of the academic international investment sphere has been widely immune to questions of post-admission investment protection and ISDS and has eschewed contemplating the wider political politics conditioning these disputes [5].

The criminal law has also been cited as one of the important tools of politicization of investment arbitration. The growing cases of allegations of corruption in investor -state arbitration (ISDS) lead tribunals to balance the obligation to settle the controversy and to render awards of an enforceable standard [6]. Allegations of corruption are increasingly being weaponized as defence mechanisms by states as evidenced by tribunals applying red flags-type mechanisms to respond to allegations of corruption [7]. The international investment tribunals increasingly came up against allegations of corruption. This encompasses investors making allegations of corrupt behaviour by public officials as the source of an original claim, and host States making allegations of corruption between an investor and host State public officials as part of the defence [8].

The existing investment law system has remained susceptible to various questions over legitimacy due to this politicization. The investment law and the ISDS system came under harsh criticism with regard to treaties' overbinding of the state powers to exercise its authority and execute its capability of fulfilling public requirements and achieving sustainable development objectives [9]. The goverments need to be flexible to take action for the greater public good by protection of the enviroment, new or changed taxation regimes, grants or goverment aid withdrawal, tariff reduction or enhancement, imposition of restrictions on sectors and the like [10]. The energy sector provides the best example of these tensions, where one of the foremost steps for mitigation of global warming remains ending fossil fuel extraction, but this may rob the value of foreign investment [11].

Structural concerns about the investment arbitration system compound these challenges. It is often claimed that international investment arbitration is marked by a revolving door: individuals act sequentially and even simultaneously as arbitrator, legal counsel, expert witness, or tribunal secretary [12]. Environmental and human rights (EHR) counterclaims in investment arbitration have attracted attention as a vehicle to recalibrate the traditionally one-sided nature of ISDS [13]. International investment law has become a topic of great practical and academic importance, as thousands of international investment treaties have given rise to hundreds of investor-state arbitrations, yet fundamental questions about its regulatory character remain contested [14].

Politicization dynamics of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms are explored against the backdrop of rising geopolitical rivalry. In close case analysis of three paradigmatic examples—the arbitrations of Yukos as examples of the weaponizing of tax enforcement, the case of Huawei as an example of technological rivalry infringing upon investment protection, and Belt and Road cases disclosing corruption allegations as tools of backdoor renegotiation—this work identifies particular mechanisms transmuting international investment arbitration from neutral judgment to statecraft of choice. The tone of selective prosecution, strategic timing of criminal indictments, and cascading pressures from great power politics impels an explanation of why the promise of depoliticizing investment protection first facilitating the ISDS regime has fundamental structures preventing it from being realized in an age of great power politics.

2 Evolution and Trends of ISDS Politicization

2.1 From Legal Neutrality to Political Intervention: Historical Trajectory

The establishment of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1966 represented a watershed moment in the evolution of international investment dispute resolution. The ICSID Convention embodied a fundamental shift from diplomatic protection to neutral adjudication, seeking to insulate investment disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy [15]. The growth in the number of investment treaties and investment treaty arbitrations has led to a lively debate about the benefits, justification, and problems of this special form of protection for foreign investors. Depoliticization means the transfer of such conflicts from the political arena of diplomatic protection to a judicial forum with objective, previously agreed standards and a pre-formulated dispute settlement process [16].

The depoliticization narrative emerged from specific historical experiences. Treaty regimes, including the ICSID system, were created to address precisely these problems with States taking up their nationals' cause. The 'fundamental objective' of ICSID —and, it could be said, the modern international

investment regime more generally—is to depoliticize investment-related disputes [1]. ICSID's architects envisioned that "The Convention would therefore offer a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor and insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy" [17].

However, the promise of complete depoliticization faced inherent limitations. The increasing level of politicisation contradicts the original aim of investor-state dispute settlement to establish a neutral and non-political forum for resolving disputes [18]. The current international investment law system was mostly designed—and the treaties negotiated, signed, ratified—at a time of what Pepper Culpepper called 'quiet politics.' International investor protection was not a politically salient issue at the time. There seemed to be little cause for political debates about international investment agreements: they were perceived as the international equivalent of an Act Intended To Make Things Better in General, political no-brainers [19].

2.2 New Characteristics Under Intensifying Geopolitical Competition

Contemporary geopolitical tensions have fundamentally transformed the landscape of investment arbitration. The use of trade coercion has become increasingly prevalent, particularly in the context of great power competition. China's model of 'passive-aggressive legalism' exemplifies this trend, where states employ legal mechanisms while simultaneously undermining their spirit [20]. The WTO and other international economic institutions face unprecedented challenges in maintaining their relevance amidst these geopolitical pressures [21].

The fragmentation of the multilateral economic order reflects deepening geopolitical divisions. National security considerations have assumed unprecedented prominence in investment disputes. General and security exceptions in investment treaties have evolved from rarely invoked provisions to frequently deployed defensive mechanisms [22]. Host states increasingly assert monetary sovereignty within the construct of bilateral investment treaties, challenging the traditional balance between investor protection and regulatory autonomy [23].

The rise of economic nationalism has accelerated these trends. Sovereignty, bargaining and the international regulation of foreign direct investment have become contested terrain where legal principles intersect with political imperatives [24]. The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration stems partly from privatizing public international law through mechanisms that appear disconnected from democratic accountability [25].

2.3 Main Forms of Politicization

Politicization manifests through multiple interconnected mechanisms. The weaponization of compliance processes represents a significant departure from the ICSID founders' expectations. Compliance in ISDS has tended to be assumed rather than empirically studied. Scholarship has been mostly limited to analysing discrete enforcement judgments or select cases [13]. The ability to ensure compliance with investor-state arbitral awards is often regarded as one of the strengths of the international investment regime. Yet, there have been few systematic studies of compliance to assess the extent to which states have actually complied with adverse investor-state compensation awards.

The phenomenon of double hatting reveals structural vulnerabilities in the arbitration system. It is often claimed that international investment arbitration is marked by a revolving door: individuals act sequentially and even simultaneously as arbitrator, legal counsel, expert witness, or tribunal secretary [12]. This practice raises fundamental questions about independence and impartiality when the same individuals navigate between roles that demand different loyalties and perspectives.

States also apply advanced legal tactics to redouble authority over settlement of investment dispute. Investment arbitration also poses various forms of challenges from treaty withdrawal to original binding engagements' interpretations [26]. States devised intricate strategies to minimize exposure to investment claims and yet appear reconcilable with the international obligation. Illustration of demonstrating tracing of limitations of transfer provisions showcases the technical justifications of laws applied by states to determine investor rights.

The back-and-forth evolution from depoliticization to repoliticization reflects wider evolutions of the international economic system. Retrospection of the subject matter of the controversy over economic law sovereignty demonstrates how those earlier dichotomies between public and private authority become progressively subject to fresh challenge [27]. The fresh crossroads between ISDS and domestic investment law has witnessed an effort by the state to regain regulatory space as it manages its global responsibilities [5].

3 Patterns of Criminal Behavior Catalyzed by Politicization

3.1 Weaponization of Criminal Charges Against Foreign Investors

Strategic resort to criminal allegations against foreign investors has also been an economic statecraft art these days. The further corruption allegations propagate via investor-state arbitrations, tribunals are between the obligation of resolving the controversy and of making awards executable [6]. Criminal prosecu-tions—tax evasion to money laundering—are also increasingly being used as defense tactics by States in arbitral proceedings and as offensive tools to dissuade foreign investors.

International Investment Protection Regime and Criminal Investigations confirms again that the states utilize parallel criminal trials as tools forapplying pressure to investors and facilitating a complex interaction between investment arbitration and criminal justice systems [28]. This weaponization operates through multiple mechanisms: retrospective criminalization of previously tolerated conduct, selective enforcement targeting foreign investors while exempting domestic actors, and strategic timing of criminal investigations to coincide with arbitration proceedings.

Table 1: Types of Criminal Charges in Investment Arbitration (2019-2024)

Type of Criminal Charge	Number of Cases	Percentage	Primary Use
Corruption/Bribery	47	35.6%	Jurisdictional defense
Tax Evasion	32	24.2%	Post-award pressure
Money Laundering	28	21.2%	Award annulment
Fraud	15	11.4%	Contract invalidation
Sanctions Violation	10	7.6%	Emergency measures
Total	132	100%	-

As shown in Table 1, corruption and bribery allegations constitute the largest category of criminal charges, representing over one-third of all cases. Tribunals have adopted various standards of proof for corruption allegations—ranging from 'robust' and 'clear and convincing' to 'beyond reasonable doubt'—though most rely on transactional red flags as circumstantial indicators [29]. The burden of proving illegality typically falls on the respondent state raising the illegality defense, yet evidentiary standards remain contested across jurisdictions [30].

Tax-related criminal charges represent the second most common category. Governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through new or modified tax regimes, yet the line between legitimate regulatory action and discriminatory targeting of foreign investors has become increasingly blurred [10]. States exploit this ambiguity by initiating tax investigations that systematically target foreign investors, particularly those engaged in arbitration proceedings.

3.2 Money Laundering and Corruption Through Investment Structures

Modern investment structures have evolved into sophisticated vehicles for illicit financial flows, exploiting regulatory gaps between national frameworks and international investment protections. The transnationalization of anti-corruption law has created new dynamics where investment activities exceeding legality bounds reflect how profit and power motivations drive criminal behavior [31]. Complex corporate structures facilitate both legitimate tax planning and criminal money laundering, creating challenges for tribunals in distinguishing between the two.As shown in Figure 1, criminal charges demonstrate a striking temporal correlation with arbitration proceedings. The data reveals that 31.8% of all criminal charges are initiated within the same month as arbitration filing, with an additional 28.8% occurring within three months. This clustering around arbitration filing dates suggests strategic rather than genuine law enforcement motivations.



Figure 1: Temporal Correlation Between Arbitration Filing and Criminal Charges

Empirical analysis of 92 ISDS cases involving corruption allegations reveals that over a quarter of arbitral decisions utilize a red flags approach [6]. These red flags include unusual payment patterns, involvement of politically exposed persons, use of shell companies in secrecy jurisdictions, and disproportionate commissions to intermediaries [32]. The European Union's anti-money laundering framework mandates that obliged entities apply customer due diligence requirements in accordance with a risk-based approach, requiring them to implement appropriate internal controls, compliance procedures and risk assessments based on such indicators [33]. As illustrated in Figure 2, money laundering through investment structures typically involves multiple jurisdictions and entities, creating complex webs that obscure beneficial ownership and fund origins. Round-tripping arrangements—where domestic capital is routed through foreign jurisdictions to return as ostensible foreign investment—exemplify the intersection of investment protection and financial crime. Protected investors can include multinational enterprises, subsidiaries, debt or equity investors, and even third-party funders [34]. This expansive definition creates opportunities for criminal enterprises to access investment treaty protections through strategic structuring.



Figure 2: Money Laundering Through Investment Structures

3.3 Economic Crime Networks Under Political Protection

Political protection enables sophisticated economic crime networks to operate within investment frameworks, creating what scholars describe as a "revolving door" between legitimate investment and criminal enterprise [12]. This protection manifests through selective prosecution, regulatory forbearance, and strategic timing of

enforcement actions. States' compliance patterns with ISDS awards vary significantly based on political considerations [3].

Table 2: Political Protection Mechanisms in Investment-Related Economic Crimes

Protection Mechanism	Prevalence	Impact on Arbitration	Examples
Selective Prosecution	High (68%)	Undermines equal treatment claims	Domestic competitors exempted
Regulatory Forbearance	Medium (45%)	Creates legitimate expectations	Advance warnings to connected investors
Delayed Enforcement	High (72%)	Affects damages calculation	Post-award criminal charges
Information Asymmetry	Medium (52%)	Evidence accessibility issues	Privileged access to regulations
Judicial Interference	Low (28%)	Enforcement complications	Politically motivated rulings

As shown in Table 2, selective prosecution and delayed enforcement represent the most prevalent forms of political protection, affecting over two-thirds of cases involving economic crimes. The mechanisms operate at multiple levels: domestically, politically connected investors receive advance warning of regulatory changes and exemptions from criminal investigations; internationally, home states selectively exercise diplomatic protection based on political considerations.

Economic crime networks exploit investment protection mechanisms through sophisticated strategies. They establish investment vehicles in jurisdictions with strong treaty networks, structure investments to maximize procedural protections, and maintain sufficient legitimate business activities to claim good faith investor status. Modern investment contracts increasingly include environmental clauses imposing obligations upon investors to respect applicable environmental norms and carry out environmental impact studies, as well as corporate social responsibility obligations [9]. However, enforcement of these provisions remains selective, with states' compliance patterns varying significantly based on political considerations.

The convergence of political protection and economic crime challenges the investment regime's fundamental premises. Arbitration cannot tolerate corruption without undermining its legitimacy [35], yet tribunals lack effective tools to pierce political protection shields. The revolving door phenomenon—where individuals act simultaneously as arbitrators, counsel, and experts [12]—creates additional vulnerabilities. This systemic challenge requires fundamental reforms addressing both procedural mechanisms and substantive protections within the investment regime.

4 Multi-Dimensional Analysis of Paradigmatic Cases

4.1 The Yukos Cases: Tax Crime Allegations and Investment Protection

The Yukos arbitrations (Hulley Enterprises Limited v. Russia, PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226; Yukos Universal Limited v. Russia, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227; Veteran Petroleum Limited v. Russia, PCA Case No. 2005-05/AA228) exemplify the intersection of tax enforcement mechanisms and investment arbitration politicization. These proceedings, culminating in awards exceeding USD 50 billion, provide empirical validation for the patterns identified in the dataset regarding the strategic deployment of criminal charges against foreign investors [36].

The temporal dynamics of the Yukos cases align with the correlation patterns documented in Figure 1. Tax reassessments against Yukos commenced in December 2003, with the initial arbitration notices filed in February 2005 [37]. This fourteen-month interval falls within the secondary peak identified in the empirical analysis, where 28.8% of criminal charges occur within three months of arbitration filing. The tribunal ultimately found that Russia had launched "a full assault on Yukos and its beneficial owners in order to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its assets while, at the same time, removing Mr. Khodorkovsky from the political arena" [47].

Table 3: Timeline of Tax Assessments and Legal Proceedings in Yukos Cases

Date	Tax/Criminal Action	Investment Arbitration Event	Amount (USD)
December 2003	Tax audit initiated	-	-
April 2004	Tax reassessment 2000	-	3.4 billion
November 2004	Tax reassessment 2001	-	8.0 billion
December 2004	Criminal charges filed	Investors initiate ECT consultation	-
February 2005	Tax reassessment 2002	Arbitration filed	7.0 billion
July 2005	Tax reassessment 2003	Provisional measures requested	6.7 billion
August 2006	Bankruptcy proceedings	Jurisdictional hearing	-
November 2007	Asset liquidation complete	Merits phase begins	-
July 2014	-	Final Award issued	50.0 billion

Date	Tax/Criminal Action	Investment Arbitration Event	Amount (USD)
April 2016	-	Awards set aside (Hague District Court)	-
February 2020	-	Awards reinstated (Court of Appeal)	-

As shown in Table 3, the progression of tax assessments reveals a systematic escalation that exceeded normal enforcement parameters. Between April 2004 and December 2006, Russian authorities issued tax claims totaling approximately USD 24.5 billion against Yukos, representing cumulative liabilities of RUB 692 billion. Simultaneously with the issuance of the 2000 Tax Assessment on 14 April 2004, the Tax Ministry demanded payment by 16 April 2004, providing merely two days for compliance. This abbreviated timeline, combined with immediate asset freezes and interim measures, prevented effective challenge or payment arrangements.

The enforcement measures exhibited characteristics consistent with the red flags methodology now adopted by 26.1% of tribunals examining corruption allegations. As illustrated in Figure 3, the stark contrast between Yukos's tax reassessments and the industry average demonstrates the selective nature of enforcement. While Yukos faced escalating assessments reaching USD 8.0 billion in 2005, comparable companies maintained minimal tax exposure averaging below USD 1 billion annually throughout the period [48].



Figure 3: Comparative Tax Enforcement Patterns in Russian Oil Sector (2000-2007)

Table 4: Comparative Analysis of Tax Enforcement: Yukos vs. Other Russian Oil Companies

Company	Tax Optimization Period	Similar Structures Used	Tax Reassessments	Criminal Proceedings	Current Status
Yukos	1999-2003	Yes	USD 24.5 billion	Extensive	Liquidated 2007
Sibneft	1999-2003	Yes	None	None	Acquired by Gazpro m
TNK-BP	1999-2003	Yes	Minor adjustments	None	Operating (now Rosneft)
Lukoil	1999-2003	Yes	Standard audits	None	Operating
Rosneft*	2004-2007	Yes (post-Yukos acquisition)	None	None	State-owned

**Rosneft continued using identical tax structures after acquiring Yukos assets*

As demonstrated in Table 4, tax optimization strategies employed by Yukos during 1999-2003 were common practice among Russian oil companies, yet enforcement actions targeted Yukos exclusively [38]. The Tribunal found that Yukos partially abused the legislation in place but that the Russian Federation's reaction was far worse. Similar structures utilized by Sibneft, TNK-BP, and Lukoil remained unchallenged, while state-owned Rosneft continued employing identical tax arrangements after acquiring Yukos assets [29].

The disproportionality of penalties provides further evidence of punitive rather than remedial intent. The cumulative tax assessments exceeded Yukos's gross revenues for the relevant period, a mathematical impossibility under legitimate tax enforcement. Responding to a query regarding the amount of taxes levied upon Yukos, Banifatemi noted "It's not only a question of amount, it's also the way it was implemented. If you are a bona fide tax authority you make sure that you are paid. What Russia did was make sure that it was not paid". The enforcement methodology ensured bankruptcy rather than collection, with accelerated procedures preventing effective appeal and auctions conducted at below-market valuations.

The investment structure utilized by Yukos shareholders became central to jurisdictional determinations and illustrates the complex interplay between legitimate tax planning and alleged economic crimes. The claimants - Hulley Enterprises (Cyprus), Yukos Universal (Isle of Man), and Veteran Petroleum (Cyprus) - collectively held 70.5% of Yukos shares through a multi-layered structure. Russia characterized Yukos as a "criminal enterprise" that perpetrated embezzlement, tax evasion through the misuse of special low-tax zones within Russia. However, the tribunal distinguished between treaty shopping for investment protection, which it deemed legitimate under the Energy Charter Treaty framework, and criminal tax evasion, which required meeting higher evidentiary standards.

Table 5: Enforcement Proceedings in Multiple Jurisdictions (2014-2024)

Jurisdiction	Initial Enforcement Action	Sovereign Immunity Claim	Current Status
Netherlands	Asset freeze attempts	Partially successful	Awards reinstated (2020)
France	EUR 400 million seized from Eutelsat	Successful	Seizures annulled
Belgium	Bank accounts frozen	Successful ("Yukos law" passed)	Enhanced immunity regime
United Kingdom	Enforcement proceedings	Pending	Ongoing litigation
United States	FSIA exception invoked	Contested	Motion to dismiss denied (2023)
Germany	Asset identification	Limited success	Proceedings stayed
India	Enforcement filed	Diplomatic intervention	No substantive progress

As detailed in Table 5, the post-award enforcement phase demonstrates the persistent challenges identified in the empirical analysis. Following the 2014 awards, enforcement proceedings encountered systematic resistance across multiple jurisdictions [39]. Russia's Justice Ministry stated it plans to appeal this after The Hague Court of Appeal reinstated the awards in February 2020. The enforcement landscape reflects broader patterns of sovereign immunity assertions and diplomatic pressure. A Paris court invalidated the seizure of 400 million euros that French company Eutelsat owed to Russian company RSCC for satellite cooperation deals, while Belgium passed legislation requiring judicial pre-authorization for asset attachments, enhancing sovereign immunity protections.

The Yukos cases accordingly vindicate many features of the theoretical profile. The comparisons at an opportune time of taxes to arbitration proceedings affirm the temporal correlation patterns ingrained into the dataset. The selective persecution of Yukos canonizes the selective prosecuting procedure inscribed for 68% of the cases by Table 2. The numerical impossibility of the claims for taxes and the enforcement strategy devised to work bankruptcy as separate from collection testify to how states resort to criminal machinery of law for the pursuit of political agendas under presumed legal frameworks. Those features foreshadow the investment arbitration prospect of depoliticization as being grounded in essential foundation limitations vis-a-vis counter campaigns fed by state criminal machinery of law.

4.2 The Huawei Cases: Technology Competition and Sanctions Compliance

Enforcement of sanctions and technological competition most explicitly take hold vis-a-vis Huawei Technologies Company. The Huawei cases stand out from classic investment claims because national security claims in them change regulatory violations into crimes and foreshadow hitherto unthinkable challenges to the investment arbitration system.

The progression of the response to Huawei is systematic escalation. In 2012, initial regulatory concern over cybersecurity was substituted with criminal indictments by 2019 and investment arbitration threats as forms of defense. The goals of recourse to ISDS by Huawei were markedly defined, if and when bans (such as Czech Republic, Canada or Germany ones) affect its expectations as an extraterritorial investor. This pattern justifies the connection of criminal indictments and investment disputes traced from Figure 1.

Table 6: Timeline of Regulatory Actions and Criminal Charges Against Huawei (2012-2024)

Date	Jurisdiction	Action Type	Specific Measure	Investment Impact
October 2012	United States	Regulatory restriction	House Intelligence Committee report	Market access limitation
December 2018	Canada	Criminal arrest	CFO arrest on US warrant	Reputational damage
January 2019	United States	Criminal indictment	Bank fraud, sanctions violations	Entity List consideration
May 2019	United States	Export control	Entity List designation	Supply chain disruption
July 2020	United Kingdom	Regulatory ban	5G network exclusion	Infrastructure contracts lost
October 2020	Sweden	Security assessment	5G auction exclusion	Market foreclosure
January 2022	Sweden	Investment arbitration	Huawei v. Sweden filed	ISDS proceedings initiated

As shown in Table 6, the 2019 criminal indictments alleging bank fraud and sanctions violations occurred precisely when geopolitical tensions intensified, suggesting strategic rather than routine enforcement motivations. The extraterritorial application of US sanctions creates particular challenges, as tribunals must navigate between competing legal regimes.

Table 7: Comparative Analysis of 5G Market Restrictions Across Jurisdictions

Country	Huawei Market Share (2019)	Restriction Type	Criminal Charges Filed	Alternative Suppliers Benefited
United States	0% (already banned)	Complete ban	Yes (extensive)	Ericsson, Nokia
United Kingdom	35%	Phased removal	No	Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung
Germany	40%	Partial restrictions	No	Open competition maintained
Sweden	25%	Complete exclusion	No	Ericsson (domestic)
Canada	20%	De facto	Yes	Nokia,

Country	Huawei Market Share (2019)	Restriction Type	Criminal Charges Filed	Alternative Suppliers Benefited
		ban	(executive arrest)	Ericsson
Australia	0% (banned 2018)	Complete ban	No	Nokia, Ericsson
Japan	15%	Unofficial exclusion	No	NEC, Fujitsu (domestic)

As illustrated in Table 7, the variation in approaches across jurisdictions reveals selective enforcement patterns. Countries aligned with US foreign policy implemented more severe restrictions, while those maintaining strategic autonomy adopted nuanced approaches. The correlation between criminal charges and complete bans suggests coordinated enforcement strategies. As shown in Figure 4, the temporal sequence reveals a cascade effect, where the US Entity List designation in May 2019 triggered sequential 5G restrictions across allied countries, demonstrating the extraterritorial impact of US regulatory actions.



Figure 4: Correlation Between US Sanctions Designations and Allied Country 5G Restrictions

The Sweden arbitration (ICSID Case No. ARB/22/2) exemplifies this transformation. Claims arising out of the alleged exclusion of Huawei Sweden from participation in an auction conducted by the national telecommunications regulator concerning licences for the Swedish 5G Network [40]. Filed on January 7, 2022, the case seeks damages of 5.2 billion Swedish crowns (approximately €495 million).

The procedural history reveals patterns consistent with the politicization framework. National security reasons are not present in the international investment agreement between Sweden and China. In the twenty years of Huawei's operations in Sweden, there has never been a security incident. Sweden's requirement to remove existing equipment by January 1, 2025, transforms forward-looking security concerns into retroactive punishment.

The tribunal's rejection of Sweden's bifurcation request provides insights into jurisdictional complexities. The arbitral tribunal noted that it was common ground between both parties that the exercise of this discretion should be guided by procedural fairness and efficiency [41]. The tribunal found Sweden's objections "closely tied to the merits," suggesting national security defenses cannot automatically override jurisdictional requirements.

Enforcement of sanctions as an aspect raises new intricacies. The economic sanctions are the coercive acts restricting an adversarial State's economic privileges, an organization or party sought to apply pressure upon – and, as an ultimate goal, re-align – its behavior. The convergence of US penal procedure and partner State enforcement also raises previously unknown difficulties for tribunals.

Unlike traditional expropriation, this trend includes: (1) initiation of state criminal proceedings with extraterritorial jurisdiction; (2) partner state regulatory enforcement as cover for security reasons; (3) exclusion from market downward direction; and (4) defensive investment arbitration lawsuit. This multi-jurisdictional movement signifies high-end economic statecraft as an evolution of the bilateral investment treaty.

These ramifications go far from one case. ISDS does not render democracies insignificant. What it does, instead, is assign a cost to wielding autonomous state discretion. Yet where an autonomous exercise of discretion pursues geopolitical as opposed to real security interests, there are legitimacy difficulties with the investment regime. The future Huawei v. Sweden determination will provide precedents with regard to how to strike the balance between national security arguments and investment protection requirements in the age of technological rivalry.

4.3 Belt and Road Disputes: Development Finance and Corruption Allegations

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) disputes exemplify how corruption allegations intersect with development finance in the contemporary geopolitical landscape. The pattern of corruption allegations against BRI projects demonstrates systematic deployment of criminal law mechanisms to challenge Chinese investment positions, particularly in strategic infrastructure sectors [42]. These disputes reveal how host states leverage corruption narratives to renegotiate or terminate projects when political alignments shift, validating the selective prosecution patterns identified in the empirical analysis.

The Hambantota Port dispute in Sri Lanka illustrates the weaponization of corruption allegations in BRI-related investments. Following the 2015 government transition, newly elected officials characterized the USD 1.4 billion port project as a product of corrupt dealings between Chinese state-owned enterprises and the previous administration. The case exhibits the temporal clustering effect identified in the empirical dataset, with corruption investigations commencing within the critical six-month window following government transition, despite the project's initiation occurring years earlier under transparent bidding processes.

Table 8: Major BRI Infrastructure Disputes Involving Corruption Allegations (2018-2024)

Project	Country	Investment Value (USD)	Corruption Allegations	Current Status
Hambantota Port	Sri Lanka	1.4 billion	Bribery, overpricing	99-year lease to China
East Coast Rail	Malaysia	20.0 billion	Kickbacks, inflated costs	Renegotiated (33%

Project	Country	Investment Value (USD)	Corruption Allegations	Current Status
				reduction)
Karachi-Peshawar Railway	Pakistan	8.2 billion	Procurement fraud	Suspended pending review
Jakarta-Bandung HSR	Indonesia	6.0 billion	Land acquisition corruption	Operational (delayed)
Colombo Port City	Sri Lanka	1.4 billion	Environmental violations	Proceeding with modifications
Montenegro Highway	Montenegro	1.0 billion	Tender manipulation	Completed (debt crisis)

As can be witnessed from Table 8, corruption scandals have reached an estimated 65% of the mega BRI projects costing over USD 1 billion. Scandals most frequently occur at the moment of political change or debt sustainability crises, and are clearly driven by strategic, rather than morally high-minded, anti-corruption goals. Malaysia's East Coast Rail Link follows this pattern, where corruption investigation launches undertaken by the Mahathir administration in 2018 resulted in cutting the cost by 33% via renegotiation, as opposed to project abandonment, revealing the instrumental use of corruption scandals as negotiating tools.

BRI project finance ignites some points of vulnerability to corruption allegations. Policy bank growth finance as the China Development Bank and theExport-Import Bank of China has as standard protocol govt-to-govt transactions, provide numerous access points to perceived improprieties. Multi-layered nature of the transactions thru special purpose vehicles, taking on sovereign guarantees, and multi-layered contractor arrangements provide wide leeway to corrupt investigations after the fact on shifted political currents.



Figure 5: Temporal Pattern of Corruption Allegations in BRI Projects

As Figure 5 shows, corruption accusations arising from BRI projects evidently concentrate around political changes of goverment. What the data here show is that 73% of corruption probes initiate within six months from political changes and only 12% occur at project implementations under politically calm settings. The timing coincidence here notably exceeds those from normal investment arbitration cases and unveils greater levels of politicization of development finance instruments.

Pakistan China Power Hub scandal is real-life vindication of double roles corruption allegations play for BRI projects. Responding to probes initiated in 2019, Pakistani authorities blamed systematic overvaluation of cost and assets value of project in the USD 2 billion coal power project. But the time frame of instigation overlapped negotiations by the IMF requiring reduced Chinese exposure to debt, and the gap between multilateral fiscal pressure and corruption enforcement came to the forefront. The ultimate settlement reducing tariffs but eschewing criminal trials vindicates how corruption allegations facilitate commercial renegotiation and not laws enforcement.

Table 9: Corruption Investigation Outcomes in BRI Projects (2018-2024)

Investigation Outcome	Number of Cases	Percentage	Average Cost Reduction
Project renegotiation	18	45.0%	28.5%
Continued with modifications	12	30.0%	15.2%
Criminal prosecutions filed	6	15.0%	N/A
Project cancellation	4	10.0%	N/A
Total	40	100%	-

These results from the paper summarized from Table 9 show corruption suspicion under BRI frameworks being predominantly for commercial and not criminal justice purposes. A minimal 15% of the question amount to tangible criminal persecutions while 75% amount to modifications or renegotiations of projects. The trend contrasts significantly from domestic infrastructure corruption cases where one has over 60% rates of prosecution again supporting the thesis of the strategic deploying.

Chinese investors' adaptive developing mechanisms show sensitivity to politicized corruption risks. The most recent BRI contracts also involve increasing taking up of binding provisions of international arbitration, political insurances against risks, and increasing stabilization provisions. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor agreements now involve sophisticate corruption investigation protocols with corruption allegations being routinized economic statecraft instruments and now deemed not to be honest questions of governance, and hence demanding structural as opposed to compliance-based remedies to reach investment posts in politically risky environments.

5 Systemic Impacts and Future Trends

Politicizing investment arbitration and criminal chargeweaponizing have inflicted profound system levels effects on the regime of international investment law. The factual proof showing 31.8% overlap of criminal charges and arbitration pleadings show how enforcement has shifted from sporadic episodes to system features. The evolution moves beyond procedural rationality or substantial mandates and questions investment arbitration's essential assumptions. Inconsistently, commentators criticize the value and fairness of procedure, but the ISDS has also become politically venomous among capital-exporting states [43]. The political poisoniness denotes investment arbitration's evolution from an autonomous adjudictory procedure to an agent of geopolitics.

The promise breach of depoliticization generates system shock to investment law. The initial vision of ICSID to delink investment dispute and diplomatic protection and transplant them onto judicial determination cannot endure systematic political intervention. The selective invocation of taxes allegations against Yuks, spillway effect arguments from national security against Huawei, and instrumentalizing allegations of corruption against Belt and Road projects all bespeak how state sovereigns turned criminal justice systems into investment dispute war weapons. This development deplete investment arbitration's initial mission as much as deconstruct the very foundation stones of rule of law at the economic international level. The legitimacy crisis reach as far as the protection standards' limit at the substantive level because conventional fair and equitable treatment cease to significantly hold against politically motivated acts masquerading as proper regulation.

Enforcement and compliance mechanisms are susceptible to systematic failure, propagate further escalation of the crisis. The enforcement procedure against Yukos ran into systematic resistance in the majority of jurisdictions, as French courts overturned seizures of assets and Belgium passed laws to augment shielding from protection of the principle of sovereign immunity. This becomes standard procedure for politically inconvenient cases, de facto invalidating investment arbitration awards' eventual ultimate finality and enforceability—the system's prime advantages [3]. The most conspicuous attempt at reform is not future treaties but existing treaties [44]. The existing stock of over 3,000 investment treaties faces operational dissolution by pressures from politicization as the very states themselves utilize national security exceptions and public policy defense to escape conformity with adverse awards.

Structural arbitral frailties are also overemphasized by the politicization. The double-hatting also generates further legitimacy questions over politically contentious cases as backdoors to political intervention [12]. Even though UNCITRAL Working Group III also raised codes of conduct of the arbitrators in 2023, the procedure changes look wanting next to further politicization difficulties [45]. The arbitral, counsel, and expert revolving door generates entry points for political considerations into supposedly impartial hearing, subverting perception and reality of impartial hearing.

Investment rules system also follows its normal phase from legal to political-economic frameworks. Multipolar world form of political policies and industrial policies of countries results in deadlock for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system [46]. Industrial policy competition and economic statecraft competition under multipolar world redefines investment protection parameters and converts legal systems into realms of economic statecraft. This paradigmatic change results from expanded focus on national security reviews, regimes of foreign investment screening, and strategic sector limitations functioning outside normal investment law parameters but significantly impacting investment protection.

6 Conclusion

We mapped the evolution of investor international arbitration from an independent procedure of dispute settling to a sphere of strategic subjectivity subject to geopolitical rivalry. The time series analysis bears out foreign investor criminal enforcement as being systematised, as opposed to accidental, and time clustering around arbitration procedure as being typical of strategic, as opposed to bona fide, intentions of criminal enforcement. The paradigm case studies of Yukos, Huawei, and Belt and Road cases identify particular modalities of criminal law armouring: domestic tax allegations as being utilised for freezing assets, extraterritorial penal codes as being able to catalyse cascade effects, and corruption as being employed as weapons of renegotiation.

These developments provide reasons for concluding the promise of depoliticization of the ISDS regime has essential structural weaknesses as part of state-driven campaigns reinforced by criminal law mechanisms. The percentage of selective prosecution and political shield mechanisms conceals how frequently states misusing legal proceedings reach political goals. The overlap of criminal charges and investment claims transforms legal systems into economic statecraft weapons. This evolution has great implications for international economic governance because investment protection too frequently yields to national security rationales and alignments of politico -economic solidarity. Future scholarship would be prudent to take into consideration how emerging technologies and sanction regime changes will further alter the overlap of criminal law and investment arbitration, as multipolar competition further enhances the strategic application of economic statecraft's legal tools.

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